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Italian Relations with China
1978-1992: The Long Carnival
Decade - Burgeoning Trade and
Diplomatic Kudos
Seamus Taggart
1 Relations between Italy and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the foundation
of the Italian State have often been cast in a negative light and in the last quarter
century,  have  in  the  main  been  characterized  as  negative  by  the  majority  of
commentators. Up until the Second World War Italy had what could be termed a quite
checkered relationship with China, particularly in regard to its pursuance of imperial
spoils in the 19th century. This picture however glosses over a much more complex
story since the Second World War and in particular overlooks a significant period in
relations  with  the  PRC,  when  Italy  played  both  a  dynamic  and  successful  role  in
economic terms –and succeeded in substantially expanding trade volumes– and in the
field of international diplomacy, where it was able to play the role of mediator between
East and West it had always coveted. This period essentially lasted from the mid-1980s
until the end of the so called First Italian Republic in 1992, when there was a dramatic
decline in diplomatic relations, followed within a few years by the same in trade. 
2 This is  a crucial period in the development of both Italy and the PRC. I  propose to
illustrate the detail of relations between the two countries in this period in order to
demonstrate  how substantial  they were and to  correspondingly  answer two crucial
questions: How did Italy achieve such success in such a short period of time, and why
did things fall apart again so quickly in the early 1990s? I will argue that the crucial
elements that account for the intensity of relations relate to the underlying policies of
both  governments  in  the  field  of  economics  which  were  determined  by  domestic
prerogatives and that the role of Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), development
aid and export credit were the determining agents in the development of relations.
Economic success provided a credible basis for a more prominent profile in diplomatic
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affairs. I propose also to examine relations between the Chinese communist party (CCP)
and the Italian communist party, in this period the largest in Western Europe. These
relations  are  important  in  illustrating  the  depth  and  understanding  the  ultimate
outcomes of many political and diplomatic initiatives.
3 The former diplomat Mario Filippo Pini provides a useful entry point. He recounts the
following exchange when he was stationed in the Italian Embassy in Beijing:
One morning in the summer of 1986 when I was commercial attaché at the Italian
Embassy in Beijing, my French colleague phoned me and said he wanted to pay me a
visit. Once in my office, he said that Italian exports to China in the previous year
had almost doubled, lifting Italy above France and placing it in second place among
Europeans, behind only West Germany. He wanted to know what the secret of our
success was. How could Italy rise above France? I responded with a partial truth. I
could  have  mentioned  our  development  aid  to  China,  which  even  then  was
becoming a significant driving force with much potential  in regard to relations.
Instead I described a precise instance that I had observed in my business travels to
Shanghai and other Chinese cities where I had regularly met Italian nationals even
in unexpected places. They did not speak Chinese, but they were flexible, ready to
get  to  grips  with  the  local  mentality,  courageous  in  advancing  their  projects,
successfully promoting engines,  machine tools  and other products that fitted in
well with the type of development that China was pursuing. By telling these things
to my French colleague, I remember I felt a sense of pride. At that time, amongst
the European countries active in China, Italy counted.1
4 This self-aware hubris provides a partial answer and also illustrates the impulse that
belies much of official Italian diplomacy in the period. Development aid and the issuing
of export credits was a major engine of growth in terms of Italian exports to the PRC in
the twentieth century. Most importantly he points out that Italian SMEs were a crucial
element in the rapid growth of Italian trade with the PRC. To understand better the
context and functioning of this flexible approach it is necessary to shift the focus to the
political and economic changes which were rapidly taking place in both countries from
the beginning of the 1980s.
5 In  the  PRC  the  essential  catalyst  for  change  was  the  reforms instigated  by  Deng
Xiaoping from 1978 onwards, termed the Period of Reform and Opening. There was a
significant break with the past and the policies of Mao. It was however Zhao Enlai who
had  first  proposed  such  reforms  in  1964,2 with  his  promotion  of  the  Four
Modernizations3 in agriculture, industry, defence and science and technology. He made
another pitch for them at the Fourth National People’s Congress in 1975.4 Zhao was
however ill with cancer and it was only after his death and that of Mao that Deng was
able to provide the necessary bulwark of support for reform and instigate concrete
measures. He was well aware that after decades of stagnation there had to be wealth
creation.  The  reforms  were  market-orientated  and  opened  up  space  for  private
enterprise.  They  were  “socialist”  in  their  intention  and  in  this  sense  Deng  can  be
compared to Gorbachev in his attempts to reform while maintaining the system. Deng
succeeded  through  determination  and  a  wily  political  sense  as  well  as  sheer
ruthlessness.  Like Gorbachev,  he unleashed something that  ultimately  he could not
completely control.  Yet he succeeded in establishing parameters.  He was pragmatic
enough to allow some reforms to play out and go with them even when they resulted in
practical liberalization that was beyond what he had originally intended. He was less
idealistic than Gorbachev and kept his eye firmly on the bigger picture, unafraid to
exert brute force when necessary. He was also wise in experimenting in limited areas
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first, setting up Special Economic Zones such as Shenzhen,5 next to Hong Kong, where
the initial reforms could be observed before some were rolled out across the country.
The fact that these reforms followed on quite quickly after the end of the Cultural
Revolution stifled dissent,  as progress was quickly registered and incomes began to
rise. In practice a space was created at the local level where a market began to operate.
National control was replaced by local control exerted by public figures and those who
most quickly were able to accumulate power and capital  in this environment.  Once
initiated, growth had to be maintained and this required a complete overhaul of the
Chinese economy. To achieve this, the PRC needed to engage with western companies
to provide the wherewithal to develop its infrastructure. Suddenly opportunities were
there for Western companies.6 
6 Unlike  in  previous  epochs,  Italy  was  well  positioned.  It  had  gone  through  its  own
economic miracle after the Second World War and the 1980s were the years of the
sorpasso, when Italian GDP overtook that of the United Kingdom. Italy was experiencing
a second boom partially due to the economic pump priming activities of Bettino Craxi
in government. It had a vibrant manufacturing economy that was on par with other
Western  European  countries.  Italian  firms  were  dominated  by  small  and  medium
enterprises. Sufficient numbers of them had the resources to send representatives to
the PRC to make contacts and negotiate contracts. In 1980, a report drawn up by the
Istituto  Affari  Internazionali  (IAI)  in  Rome  on  the  potential  of  Italian  economic
relations with the PRC stated: “Fortunately it seems now that the PRC does not have the
intention of following a program of industrialization aimed primarily at exporting.”7
This situation would obviously change in time but nevertheless there would be at least
a decade of opportunity in a primarily buyers’ market. The report concluded:
If our analysis of the objectives of the opening of the Chinese economy is correct,
then one must conclude that an intensification of economic relations can only be
achieved by moving from a purely commercial approach to a strategy of economic
cooperation. This means on the one hand, expanding complementarities through a
joint  venture  […].  Particularly  important  would  be  the  creation  of  a  financial
instrument to facilitate industrial  cooperation that can utilize the capital of the
joint  venture  when  it  is  necessary  to  facilitate  the  participation  of  the  Italian
company and, more importantly, to act as a buffer in relation to any changes in the
distribution of shares among the partners in order to avoid possible conflicts. It is
also conceivable that some of the funds made available to the credit for exports to
China could usefully be redirected to the creation of such a financial instrument.8
7 Unfortunately  neither  conclusion was  really  followed through upon,  the  overriding
tendency was to promote the short term. A system of export credit was indeed put in
place and, as we shall see, this gave a sustained impetus to Italian exports to the PRC.
The direction of this aid would have a major impact. Smaller Italian firms found out
they could access the Chinese market directly. There was no longer the need to work
through entities  such as  Dino Gentili’s  Compagnia Generale  Interscambi  (COGIS).  In
ignoring the longer term strategic elements of the Istituto Affari Internazionali report,
there  was  the  risk  that  economic  relations  would  become  unbalanced  and  indeed
precarious. 
8 Thus,  in  the  context  of  increased  economic  flexibility  on  both  sides,  relations
significantly intensified on all levels. To illustrate the depth and complexity that they
eventually achieved, it is necessary to provide an outline of the main developments. In
1978  Huang  Hua  visited  Europe  and  Italy  comforted  itself  as  being  included  as  a
destination. In the same year four Italian Government Ministers travelled to Beijing,
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including Minister of Public Education Mario Pedini, Minister of Health Tina Anselmi,
Minister  of  Foreign  Trade  Rinaldo  Ossola,  and  Minister  of  Transport,  Vittorino
Colombo. In addition Ugo La Malfa, leader of the Partito Repubblicano Italiano visited
Beijing on 25th September of the same year. Colombo met Deng Xiaoping, who would
assume publicly the reins of power in the CCP Congress of December that same year.
The PRC was eager to gain a reliable interlocutor in Europe. Since West Germany could
only whisper, the UK’s European voice was muffled and France apt in any dialogue to
conflate Europe with France, an opportunity existed for Italy to make itself heard as a
practical interlocutor. Beijing saw Italy as a component of what it hoped would be a
united Europe and counter pillar to both United States and the USSR. In the wake of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Deng developed the theme of Europe, continuing on
from where Zhou Enlai had left off with Colombo in 1973: 
Much more than China, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan affect Europe. [The USSR]
wants to maintain a strategy of encirclement; it wants to win without fighting. At
this point, Europe must choose, it cannot wait to decide whether the rope is already
tight or can be tightened more. It must now decide if it wants to be free, in order to
be free it has to be united and strong.9
9 However, such a strategic discourse mattered more in Beijing than in Rome, where the
domestic agenda dominated, and fluctuating political control left Italy very much in
the  second  tier  where  European  decisions  were  taken.  Italy  no  longer  possessed
European statesmen. Beijing nevertheless would persevere in trying to convince Italy
to play a positive role, as the PRC continued to open to the West. During Huang Hua’s
visit to Italy from 5th to 10th October 1978 he expanded on the new Chinese theory of
the  Three  Worlds.  During  his  visit  a  cultural  agreement  was  also  signed.  The
intensification of relations was noted by the USSR and Brezhnev sent an abrasive letter
to Prime Minister Andreotti, complaining that the help that Italy was proffering to the
PRC was unwelcome, particularly as it seemed that it might well also aid the PRC in
modernizing its military sector. This, he maintained, would adversely affect détente.10
Little official or unofficial note was taken of Brezhnev’s letter and relations with the
PRC continued on an upward trajectory. 
10 The  next  year  saw  Deng  Xiaoping  visit  the  US,  as  official  relations  were  finally
established and Prime Minister and President of  the Chinese Communist  Party Hua
Guofeng visited Italy from the 3rd to the 6th November 1979. Rome was now a fixed
stop on the route to Paris, Bonn and London. Security and global issues were discussed.
This visit also marked the beginning of regular consultations. Meetings were also held
with  Bettino  Craxi,  Pietro  Nenni  and  Enrico  Berlinguer.  Agreements  were  signed
covering economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, as well as an accord
for  the opening of  consulates  in  Shanghai  and Milan.11 Hua underlined that  “these
relations have entered a new phase of development and agreements signed in recent
days have laid the basis for further growth in exchanges.”12 This was in conformity to
Hua’s description of Chinese plans: “China is a developing country which has laid the
foundations of industrialization. From this year on and for the next three years, China
will make serious efforts through further adjustments to its plans for a proportional
constant and rapid development of its economy.”13 
11 Momentum in relations was maintained by the State visit of Italian President Sandro
Pertini accompanied by Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo in September 1980. This was a
calculated  move  on  Rome’s  part,  sending  the  veteran  Socialist  Party  leader  and
sparring partner of Nenni in tandem with Colombo, who had been Prime Minister when
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relations  were  established  in  1970.  The  difference  between  the  Socialists  and  the
Christian Democrats had always been that the former had a clear international ideology
(at least until the advent of Craxi’s leadership when it became subservient to domestic
imperatives),  whereas  the  latter  stuck  to  an  ill-defined  and  thus  hugely  flexible
amalgam of Atlanticism and support for a more integrated Europe. The priority was to
avoid offending international  partners rather than incurring the risk of  taking any
major initiatives. As Pini described it: “Pertini responded to his interlocutors with the
idealism which came natural to him, posing those questions out loud, that all men of
good sense have always asked.”14 The Italian President was uniquely able to rise above
party interests and factionalism and to speak his mind. However such discourses rarely
impact actual policy making. During his meeting with Deng Xiaoping, Deng turned to a
more practical level and enquired “How is Oriana Fallaci? […] she put me to the test for
four hours.” Pertini responded: “It was you who did the testing […] and I can assure you
she passed with flying colours. The interview is a consummate piece of work.”15 Oriana
Fallaci’s  interview16 with  Deng  Xiaoping provided  an  interesting  aside  to  the  more
regular channels of diplomacy and trade negotiations. The sparring between the two
was on a par with Frost and Nixon. The text of the exchanges provides both insight and
entertainment and certainly added to Italian prestige in regard to its relations with the
PRC. Overall as a goodwill trip Pertini’s visit worked well and was seen by Beijing as a
gesture that took account of Chinese sensibilities.
12 Trade relations were now poised to take off. In 1978 the main imports from the PRC
were  basic  manufactures,  including  wooden  products  and  textiles,  totaling
169,000 million lire.17 Exports were dominated by chemical products and machine tools,
totaling 160,000 million lire,18 representing a small but significant trade deficit. By 1984
imports  had  grown  by  a  factor  of  five,  textiles  still  a  very  significant  element,
particularly  silk.  Exports  had  grown  even  more  to  yield  a  balance  of  trade  of
25,000 million lire, chemicals and steel products being important elements in the mix.19
13 From 1984 until  the Tiananmen Square crackdown, Italian exports to the PRC were
second only to West Germany’s. In 1985, Italian exports to China grew 40 percent from
the previous year.20 Italy would record a comfortable trade surplus until 1988. Italian
exports were dominated by machinery and machine tools, produced in the main by
SME’s. Italian imports from China were mainly labour intensive goods such as textiles.
Total  trade would continue to grow strongly both imports and exports  showing an
increasing  trend  well  into  the  1990s,  before  the  dip  subsequent  to  the  Tiananmen
Square incident. Italy however, at least on the economic level, was “punching above its
weight” to use Douglas Hurd’s recognized international measure.21 This period from the
mid-1980s until 1992 represented the high point of Italian relations with the PRC in the
twentieth  century.  Even  with  the  Tiananmen  Square  crackdown,  relations  would
remain relatively close. 
14 Major  Italian  companies  had  entered  China  in  the  1950s.  President  of  the  Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) Enrico Mattei made a surprise trip to Beijing in 1958 to
promote  it.  Italian  petrochemical  and  automotive  companies  had  done  respectable
business in an era of strict controls. This business was to increase steadily in the 1980s.
As part of the same delegation led by Hua Guofeng in November 1979, the Chinese Vice-
Prime Minister Yu Qiuli paid a visit to FIAT in Turin where discussions were held on the
provision of  tractors  and earth moving machinery by FIAT.  Giovanni  Agnelli  had a
separate personal meeting with Hua Guofeng in Rome. Hua also met a delegation of
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approximately 50 representatives of Italian industry. On departure Hua declared: “Italy
is an industrialized nation. You have much experience that would be of use to us and
for this reason we would be very happy to have Italian industrialists visit us.”22 This
statement basically sums up the rationale behind Chinese efforts to intensify relations
between the two countries over the following decade. A protocol had been signed in
April that year which opened up a credit line of $1 billion. Thus on the economic front
relations were finally gearing up.
15 FIAT had since 1976 been developing a China project which envisaged the production of
FIAT  tractors  and  other  agricultural  machinery  in  China,  with  an  initial  projected
production rate of 20,000 tractors per annum.23 A contract to this effect would only
finally be signed in June 1985.24 In October 1979 an official FIAT office was opened in
Beijing.25 
16 In  the  wake  of  Hu Yaobang’s  later  trip  to  FIAT in  Turin,  a  contract  was  signed in
September 1986, which provided for the provision of technical assistance from FIAT
and the setting up of a joint venture between Iveco and the Nanjing Motor Corporation
for  the  production  of  light  lorries  from the  Daily range.  It  was  envisaged  that  the
Chinese  government  would  invest  $260 million.26 Aeritalia  had  also  just  signed  a
contract valued at $200 million.27 In 1988 FIAT was still hoping to establish itself as a
producer of cars for the commercial marketplace. Back in December 1972 at an Italian
Trade Show in Beijing, Marshall Yeh Jan Ying had remarked to Italian representatives:
“Your cars are lighter than the Soviet ones and more solid than the Japanese.”28 It was
the Germans however who were to get in first. Volkswagen had got the go ahead from
Beijing to set up a plant in 1985, but its production was still limited, only producing
12,000 cars a year. There was still space in the Chinese market for another player and
FIAT proposed its  Panda as  a  suitable  option.  Nothing eventually  came of  this  and
Volkswagen was instead to enjoy massive expansion and a very lucrative monopoly in
the Chinese market for the next couple of decades. The ubiquity of Volkswagens on
Chinese  streets  is  such  that  they  are  considered  to  be  Chinese  by  much  of  the
population.
17 In the 1980s and 1990s however Italian trade with the PRC was dominated by SMEs. The
Italian SME sector was a volatile one and fluctuating market trends left many Italian
companies focused on the Chinese market for only a number of years. In the recently
deregulated Chinese market these smaller companies were often able to negotiate the
challenges at  this  level  better than larger enterprises.  There had been an influx of
smaller Italian companies into the PRC as it opened up. They were able to benefit from
both  deregulation  and  lack  of  oversight.  This  trade  remained  substantial  until
stagnation in the domestic Italian economy constrained the activities of SMEs and trade
stagnated from the mid-1990s onwards. 
18 Returning to the detail of relations, there had in the meantime been some diplomatic
missteps. Bettino Craxi finally officially visited China in 1986. The visit was viewed as a
catch up measure and the Chinese had noted the lack of an official visit at this level.
The French, West German and British Prime Ministers had made the trip mostly shortly
after  Deng  Xiaoping  had  stabilized  his  control.  Two  Chinese  Prime  Ministers  Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang had visited Italy.  There had been a visit  to the PRC by a
delegation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) led by Alessandro Natta, and on their
return to Rome, one of the messages that was to be conveyed to the government was
that Beijing had noted the lack of an official visit at Prime Ministerial level. It was billed
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of course as historic being the first by an Italian Prime Minister, but Craxi as leader of
the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) did not follow in the footsteps of either Nenni or Pertini.
Craxi’s visit was viewed as a superficial one. Andreotti who was part of the entourage as
Foreign Minister defined the delegation sarcastically as “Craxi and his fine friends.”29
Italy had experienced significant economic growth in the 1980s and its trade balance
with the PRC was very healthy. Craxi could afford to be magnanimous and indicated
that Italy would be disposed to buy Chinese oil to help balance trade. During the trip,
agreements were signed on matters which included taxation, health and nutrition and
the cooperation in the university sector.30
19 During  this  period  there  was  also  cooperation  in  defence  procurement.  A  general
accord for military cooperation was signed by the Italian Defence Minister Giovanni
Spadolini during his mission to the PRC in April 1985. The PRC had previously shown
interest in installing FIAT engines in PLA tracked military lorries. MAGIRUS –a German
subsidiary of the IVECO branch of FIAT– had sent examples of military lorries with
Deutz  air-cooled  engines  to  the  PRC  already  in  1978.  It  was  determined  that with
suitable alterations to the body of the lorries FIAT engines could be installed. A meeting
between  the  Commercial  Director  of  MAGIRUS  and  the  former  General  Schenz,
consultant  to  MAGIRUS,  was  held  with  a  Chinese  military  attaché  in  Bonn  on  the
28th February 1979. In the end, it seems that the eventual solution was the production
of the FIAT Daily lorry in China. IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) had been
hoping to  sell  frigates  to  the  PRC but  these  did  not  meet  the  specifications  of  the
Chinese  navy.  It  was  however  envisaged  that  Italy  would  supply  the  PRC  with  jet
fighters, transport planes, avionics, mines torpedoes and also provide military training
for Chinese military personnel in Italy. Italy had to explain the reasoning behind these
projected sales to the US military export control committee (COCOM) but permission
was  eventually  obtained.31 In  1986  the  defence  contractor  Oto  Melara  was  in
negotiation for  a  large  contract  for  artillery  with the  PLA.32 Alenia  won significant
contracts to supply radar installations to civilian airports from 1989 onwards, beating
out stiff US competition and in January 1992 established a joint venture with the PRC
firm  RIDA  and  the  Hong  Kong  company  Dragon  Base  to  produce  civilian  radar
installations.33 This also had implications for the military sector. Francesco Sisci states
that at this point Alenia supplied 70 percent of Chinese radar requirements.34 The US
gave  its  ultimate  blessing  to  all  these  endeavours  after  Nixon’s  visit  to  the  PRC.
Previously such cooperation on such developed systems would have been unthinkable.
Italy  was  viewed as  relatively  neutral  in  the  overall  context  of  the  Cold  War.  This
allowed  it  a  certain  leeway  and  the  US  without  being  seen  as  the  prime  mover,
promoted certain exports in armaments to the PRC as a way of counterbalancing the
USSR.  Despite  the  importance  of  these  showpiece  trade  agreements,  larger  Italian
companies accounted for a  minority of  trade value.  Italian SME’s  accounted for far
more business.
20 The overall picture of diplomatic interaction and trade relations thus is seemingly a
glowing one. However the two most important elements underlying this as previously
intimated  were  development  aid  and  the  role  of SMEs.  An  agreement  had  been
concluded in 1979 for the year 1982-1983, that provided for $48 million in credit and
$25 million  in  development  aid.35 The  former  was  to  be  a  credit  line  to  aid  the
construction of industrial plant in China under the auspices of projects such as those
elaborated  by  ENI  and  FIAT  to  manufacture  products  in  China,  the  latter  was
government spending on Italian products  such as  hospital  equipment to be sent to
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China.  By the third programme 1987-1989,  credit  aid  had risen to  $576 million and
$95 million  for  development  aid.  This  put  Italy  among  the  principal  suppliers  of
development aid and credit in Europe. The main problem with the aid was that it was
not programmed or targeted at strategic sectors. It was handed out primarily to benefit
the balance sheet  of  the Italian companies  that  were involved.  The system became
analogous to that of government tendering within Italy. Massimo Iannucci, a former
Italian ambassador to the PRC, pointed out the problems inherent in an article in 2000,
where he lamented the tendency of Italian development aid to be tied to the interests
of  private companies.36 Aid was dispensed piecemeal  and as  part  of  the established
system of dispensing favours by the political parties. This was to have major future
consequences. 
21 In  the 1980s  the stultifying rule  of  the Christian Democrats  had produced a  honed
clientelist system within Italy binding politics and business.  This system now met a
similar emerging structure in China. As Kwan Ha Yim describes in the Chinese context
of the early 1980s:
Up until  a  few years previously,  during the Cultural  Revolution,  the nation was
hypnotized  by  Maoist  rhetoric  describing  a  permanent  revolution  and  one  was
resigned to the sacrifices required. Now the people have in front of them a vision of
happiness  which  is  achievable  through  the  path  of  material  wealth.  The  party
leaders in the countryside, who in the past would have managed the agricultural
system, liberated of many of their old duties, have begun to transform themselves
into a  new class  of  rural  bosses.  Other  party  functionaries  thanks to  their  new
power,  find  themselves  in  the  ideal  position  to  obtain  ‘brown  envelopes’  in
exchange for favouring foreign investors and local businessmen.37
22 Italian businesses thrived in this unregulated nexus. One cannot however negate the
point that Pini made that a significant element of entrepreneurship also accounted for
Italian success. For half a decade trade continued to burgeon. The hubris of Craxi was to
eventually presage a catastrophic fall. 
23 However events in Beijing were almost to precipitate an even greater catastrophe. Hu
Yaobang  and  Zhao  Ziying  had  pushed  reforms  and  certain  of  these  were  carried
through. The funeral of Hu Yaobang brought many of the students onto the streets. The
historical  visit  of  Gorbachev  to  Beijing  after  thirty  years  of  mutual  animosity  was
overshadowed by the demonstrations. Deng ever the realist decided that matters were
not to be allowed to get out of hand. The crackdown on the night of 3rd-4th June 1989
caused many fatalities. An account of these days from a firsthand Italian perspective
can be read in the pages of Ilaria Fiore the RAI correspondent in Beijing’s account, Tien
An Men.38 Led by the US, Western governments broke off contacts with the PRC in the
aftermath  of  this  and  sanctions  were  imposed,  including  an  arms  embargo.  This
breakdown in relations, the first significant step backwards since the Korean War, was
to provide an opportunity for Italy. Within a matter of days after the crackdown, an
aircraft was sent to evacuate Italian nationals. The Berlin Wall came down in November
of the same year and the whole Communist system in Europe disintegrated. With so
much  change  taking  place  the  wisdom  of  isolating  China  was  beginning  to  be
questioned. In October 1990 the EU began to reestablish contacts, partly through the
efforts of the Italian government who occupied the rotating Presidency in the latter
half of 1990. The arms embargo though was left in place. US Undersecretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Advisor Brent Snowcroft arrived in Beijing
in November. In the same period an Italian mission led by Bruno Bottai was sent to
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Beijing to assess the situation. By this stage the US had long since ceased to issue orders
to its Allies on such strategic matters. Europe as a whole had post Nixon exited its US
cocoon.  The  Christian  Democrat  member  of  Parliament  (and  shortly  afterwards
Minister  of  the  Interior)  Vincenzo  Scotti  travelled  to  Beijing.  In  May  1991  Foreign
Minister  Gianni  De  Michelis  headed  to  Beijing  and  in  November  Prime  Minister
Andreotti sojourned there too. The Spanish Foreign Minister had travelled the previous
autumn and there had been some Portuguese and British contacts ostensibly in regard
to  their  colonies.  Chinese  Prime Minister  Li  Peng  often  portrayed as  the  villain  of
Tiananmen visited Italy, Spain and Portugal in January 1992. He specifically referred to
Italy’s role as a bridge in that era.39 Pini states:
Perhaps, with our activism in favour of China, we were opportunists, motivated by
the desire to take up business opportunities in contrast to the activism in that era
of  some  of  our  European  partners  such  as  the  Scandinavians  always  ready  to
crusade for human rights.40
24 Human rights never really played any meaningful role in dialogue between Italy and
China, and Pini is correct to cite commercial interests as a major spur to reestablishing
relations. Sisci however also ascribes a strategic element in that there was US support
and contact behind the scenes in supporting Italian efforts. This was he maintains in
the context of the First Gulf War when the US was worried about having China beyond
the Pale when such a conflagration was occurring.41 In an interview in 1995 De Michelis
explained the opening in the following terms.
Newly appointed Foreign Minister in November 1989, I realized that the closure of
the West towards China was the wrong answer to Tiananmen. I always thought that
the embargo did not serve anything. And above all, the Chinese gave the impression
that we did not understand the real issue, and we once again we had undervalued
the  issues  involved  and  had  taken  refuge  in  our  reassuring  simplifications.  In
November of 1989 I already assumed the position of a “heretic” at an exhibitors’
conference  on  China  organized  by  the  left  leaning  Centro  Studi  di  Politica
Internazionale (CeSPI)42 in Bologna. Against the advice of diplomats of the Foreign
Ministry, I wanted to go there and explain that our concern was to encourage the
opening up towards China and therefore that the punitive sanctions had to be lifted
as soon as possible.43 
25 De  Michelis  was  able  to  follow  through  on  his  analysis,  for  once  an  active  realist
position. Undoubtedly trade was a major factor in his calculations but he was able to
present himself as somewhat of a pioneer, though not quite unique, as Pini points out
that the Spanish Foreign Minister visited Beijing before him. Almost immediately in
order  to  regain  economic  momentum  Italy  guaranteed  600 billion  Lira  to  China  in
relation to the Pudong development which was just then getting underway and was
destined to radically change the face of Shanghai and to present to the world a new
skyline as memorable as that of Manhattan. This diplomatic role undoubtedly did help
to  give  Italy  a  more  prominent  profile  as  a  constructive  actor  in  the  international
sphere.
26 Then, the flood. The whole Italian political system was swept away in less than two
years. Though the Christian Democrat vote had been declining over the years, it was
the fall of communism in the USSR that removed a major reason for its existence and
support as a bulwark against communism. A bribery investigation initiated in Milan in
February  1992  –referred  to  as  Tangentopoli–  began  to  spread  and  eventually  when
internal divisions scuppered the possibility of silencing the judges, the whole edifice of
Italian  politics  was  toppled.  The  investigations  had  the  effect  of  decimating  the
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promised Italian input in the Pudong project, as the funds earmarked were suspended
since the awarding of contracts had been illegal. Indeed at least one Italian ambassador
was arrested as the investigations reached the level of export credits and foreign aid.44
Thus the motor behind the growth in trade was turned off. Di Michelis categorized this
as a tragedy:
From the second half of 1992, the Italian crisis began, the Foreign Ministry turned
off the taps in relation to cooperation and the entire country virtually disappeared
from the international stage. The cooperation between Italy and China was one of
the main victims of this. To ensure nothing was done wrong, the Foreign Minister
blocked all cooperation projects initiated during my administration, including the
Pudong initiative. For nearly three years, no Foreign Minister travelled to Beijing.45
27 This  represented  the  fracture  from  which  relations  have  not  really  recovered.  He
himself  later  was  almost  thrown  into  a  canal  in  Venice  after  his  own  trial  and
conviction  for  malfeasance.  As  Pini  dryly  states  when  describing  the  events:  “The
Chinese,  as  I  remembered  from  the  first  page  of  the  life  of  Lucius  Wu,  have  long
memories”.46 
28 Yet there is also an alternative relevant narrative in this period, one that recounts an
important story that was significant for a large section of the Italian population that
was  not  represented  in  government.  It  is  largely  overlooked  since  it  only  had  a
marginal  effect  on  actual  diplomatic  and  economic  relations  between  the  two
countries. However it is very much worth recounting, as it did have a major effect on
how Beijing viewed Italy and thus in some way did affect its conduct both internally
and externally. To do this it is necessary to return to the beginning of the period being
discussed.
29 Vittorino  Colombo,  then  Christian  Democrat  Minister  of  the  Mercantile  Marine,
travelled to the PRC in 1978, just shortly after the assassination of Aldo Moro by the
Red Brigades. Deng expressed his shock at the act and also his bewilderment that the
organization responsible ostensibly declared that it drew its inspiration from Marxism
Leninism and the teachings of Mao Zedong. The effects of the Cultural Revolution were
receding rapidly. It was not long after this that relations were reestablished between
the PCI and the Chinese Communit Party (CPC). In Rome in 1979 the first steps were
taken when representatives of the CPC met with members of the PCI. It took a year of
encounters and position papers and statements declaring the precise positions of each
party before practical relations were reestablished. The initial signal had arrived on
1st February 1979 as PCI representative Antonio Rubbi was given the task of developing
the renewed links after over 15 years of virtual non communication, as he describes in
his volume Appunti cinesi dedicated to PCI relations with China from that date up to
1991.47 The process of recovery was indeed a “long march.”48 It seems as if in one sense
that the careful footwork was essentially an unraveling of the detailed denouncements
that had presaged the break almost two decades previously. By the time Berlinguer
travelled to Beijing in April 1980, he had been elevated to most honoured guest status.
The Soviet  invasion of  Afghanistan had caused a  rupture  between the  PCI  and the
Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  (CPSU)  which  adjusted  their  place  in  the
pantheon. The visit was termed an “historical trip” across the Italian press.49 Berlinguer
outlined the motivations of the visit in an article published in L’Unità,  “Why We are
Travelling to China”:
We go because we believe it  is  necessary and to our advantage to gain a better
understanding  of  the  conditions  and  real  situations  in  which  the  two  parties
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operate and how politics functions. We go with a clear understanding –on our own
part  and  also  that  of  our  Chinese  comrades–  that  respect  for  our  respective
positions and mutual autonomy is the basis for a frank dialogue, both in terms of
points of agreement and on those we have different positions on. These exist and
there is no need to hide them. They concern, as is known, many positions, analysis
and procedures on various issues. But we go there essentially to look for the space
in terms of a possible meeting ground where relations between two parties, two
countries  and  two  peoples  and  the  great  issues  of  peace  and  international
cooperation  might  be  constructively  developed  […].  Never  before,  when  the
international scene is increasingly prone to tensions,  divisions and dangers,  has
this need appeared so necessary. We are witnessing a deterioration of international
relations so serious that one might fear an imminent catastrophe. This situation
demands the wider mobilization of those forces who realize the need to propose
new ideas so as to address the crisis and thus reopen a constructive and peaceful
dialogue on issues and objectives on which the salvation of humanity depends: new
international relations, founded on justice and equal dignity, respect for the right
of  peoples  to  free  themselves  from  imperialist  domination  and  other  forms  of
foreign interference regarding disarmament and the use of resources.50
30 Berlinguer’s use of language is interesting on a number of levels. In the first instance it
conveys the fears and preoccupations of the Cold War era.  In concentrating on the
minute  details  of  interstate  relations  this  element  can  often  lose  its  significance.
Berlinguer speaks as a protagonist. The language of the Christian Democrats was more
often than not drawn from the script of a subordinate, eschewing the bigger issues and
concentrating  on  the  dues  to  be  paid.  Effectively  Berlinguer  broadened  the  Italian
interaction with China significantly  in terms of  international  relations.  The themes
however  remained  largely  global  rather  than  bilateral  since  the  PCI  remained  in
opposition.  They  served  well  in  Beijing  however  to  establish  a  cordial  working
relationship again between the two parties. The warmth of Berlinguer’s character was
also an element which helped cement relations, helping him establish a close personal
rapport with Chinese leaders.
31 One other thing was clear, at one stroke the PCI had supplanted the PSI as Beijing’s
preferred interlocutor. During the final meeting between the PCI delegation and Hu
Yaobang, Pietro Nenni was lauded in conversations but it was clear that there was no
longer any real connection between Beijing and the new leadership of the PSI. Bettino
Craxi  had  visited  China  in  the  meantime  but  only  with  an  invitation  from  the
Association for Friendship between Peoples and had thus not met any politicians of
note. On the suggestion of the PCI delegation that Beijing should invite him officially,
the Chinese demurred and instead noted the upcoming visit of Pertini, “Is he not a
Socialist too?”51 Hu Yaobang inquired. Rubbi notes that the smiles that greeted Hu’s
remark indicated that Beijing was well  informed on the vicissitudes within the PSI.
Dino Gentili was still involved in commercial ventures in China but the political aspect
tied to the PSI had distinctly receded.
32 Rubbi describes vividly Hu Yaobang’s clarification of the Cultural Revolution era and its
implications in relation to Italy:
It  remained  for  the  visibly  embarrassed  Hu  Yaobang  to  offer  the  required
clarification. He returned to the years of the Cultural Revolution. They were not
only disastrous for the upheaval caused throughout the country, but also for the
image of that the CCP had presented to the world. Instead of connecting with the
forces  more  representative  of  the  labour  movement  and  national  liberation
movements it had often encouraged small groups on the fringes of the political and
cultural  scenes  of  their  own  countries,  who  claimed  to  support  the  political
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ideology then prevailing in China. This was also the case in relation to Italy and for
that Hu now almost apologized. He expressed his regret and assured us that they
would no longer have any kind of links with such groups. Pajetta52 relieved him
from any further embarrassment with yet another joke: “There are far more serious
messes which we could think of”.53
33 There was no point dragging the issue of the death of Aldo Moro into the conversation
and one understands the clear objective of the PCI to reestablish uncomplicated links
with Beijing, however Pajetta’s remark was ill-weighed in discounting maybe too much.
In  any  case,  practical  steps  were  agreed.  L’Unità gained  permission  to  locate  a
permanent correspondent in Beijing and like in the 1950s, a group of Italian students
would attend Chinese universities to study Chinese culture and language. Interestingly,
a request was also made by the Chinese for help in preparing a translation into Chinese
of the works of Antonio Gramsci. The final press conference Rubbi describes as a unique
experience: “It was the first time in the post-Mao China had opened itself so publicly to
the outside world.”54 At the banquet that followed, in his final speech in Beijing before
departure, Berlinguer summed up what had been achieved:
These  conversations  were  very  useful,  it  seems  to  us,  for  better  mutual
understanding  of  the  politics  professed  by  our  parties  and  their  objective  and
subjective  motivations.  The  points  of  consensus  and  those  of  divergence  have
become much clearer. But it is very important, in any case to have tried even when
our respective positions are different and even widely diverging, to find a meeting
point where dialogue might emanate from and sometimes bring positive results
[…]. You should know, dear comrades, that the links that the PCI has re-established
with your party, it intends to maintain and develop in the context of links with
other communist parties and many other workers and democratic forces all over
the world, corresponding to our vision of internationalism as an Italian element as
a force that is part of a larger progressive movement in Europe and the world […].
We came to China also to contribute to the development of every sector of relations
between the two countries,  those which correspond to the national  interests  of
Italy and the People’s Republic of China. Also in this sense we feel we have made
progress.55
34 One can appreciate from the language used the points of difference Beijing would have
had and the fact that they would have through their realist lens have viewed the PCI as
being  compromised  in  both  the  context  of  national  politics  and  the  Communist
International. Nevertheless in grappling with their own opening to the West and the
consequences of free market economics the relationship certainly was of use and, as
Berlinguer stated, the PCI would also promote the Italian national interest as well as
theoretical  global  socialist  ideas.  Le Monde categorized Berlinguer’s  trip as “another
step taken by the PCI on the road away from the USSR and towards Europe.”56 The PCI
had condemned the invasion of  Afghanistan in December 1979 by the USSR and in
declining an invitation to attend an international Communist Party gathering in Paris
the  same year  had  made  clear  its  differences  with  Moscow.  This  of  course  greatly
pleased Beijing. The PCI’s relations with Moscow however remained complicated as it
attempted to balance various strategic impulses.
35 The  relationship  between  the  two  parties  developed  steadily  and  was  marked  by
respect. In July 1981, Politburo member and ex-Mayor of Shanghai, Pong Chong, visited
Rome  and  Milan  when  a  Twin  City  agreement  between  the  latter  a  Shanghai  was
signed. When Hu Yaobang issued an invitation to Berlinguer and his family to spend
their holidays in the PRC in the summer of 1983, it was readily accepted. The Rubbi
family were also to be included in the travelling party. The political situation in Italy in
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those  years  of  extremist  violence had made the annual  summer holiday more of  a
period of almost house arrest as security was deployed with a heavy hand. Instead the
two weeks that Berlinguer spent in China he described as splendid.57 The other aim
apart  from  some  relaxation  was  to  discern the  Chinese  position  on  a  number  of
national and international issues, which they were to discover as essentially the same
as those expressed three years previously. On arrival in Beijing, Berlinguer was given a
distinguished reception, on the same level Rubbi maintains that was only reserved for
Kim Il  Sung.58 Rubbi describes the meetings with Hu Yaobang and other officials as
jovial59.  On his departure Hu Yaobang, used the opportunity to get his own message
across that: “For the socialist modernization of China –we need peace and stability.”60
Berlinguer’s parting words were to invite Hu to Italy, his response: “I will… I will visit
with pleasure, as soon as I can.”61 Unfortunately Berlinguer would not see Hu Yaobang
visit Italy; instead in June 1984, Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang interrupted his
visit to Norway to attend Berlinguer’s funeral in Piazza San Giovanni. Zhao remained
the following day in Rome. The PCI seemed a little taken aback concerning the strength
of feeling displayed by Zhao and his entourage in regard to Berlinguer. Rubbi related
the enquiries of Zhou regarding the scenes at Berlinguer’s funeral:
What does it mean for Italy and the Italians I have seen in Piazza San Giovanni? He
maintained it was something similar to the funeral of Zhou Enlai (the pain of the
people when it is sincere, one senses and feels it well beyond the [formal] directives
of the party).62
36 Alessandro  Natta  replaced  Berlinguer  as  party  leader  and  astutely  continued  the
development of relations with Beijing. The PCI speaker of the House of Deputies, Nilde
Iotti,  briefly  visited  China  shortly  afterwards,  invited  by  a  Chinese  Women’s
Association, followed by Giorgio Napolitano, Macaluso and Pajetta. Natta as new party
leader arrived in Beijing in October 1985.  The invitation had been proffered a year
previously, when Natta had been elected to replace Berlinguer. At the first banquet Hu
Yaobang invoked the memory of  Berlinguer:  “his vision,  his  deep thought,  his  self-
effacing style and honesty, his firmness and determination will remain forever in our
memory.”63 He added a reference to a Chinese proverb: “flowers in spring, fruit in the
autumn.”64 Berlinguer  had  caused  the  blossoms  to  flower  and  Natta  was  there  to
harvest the benefits. 
37 The meeting with Deng Xiaoping was auspicious. Deng spoke about his first encounter
with representatives of the PCI in the 1920s when he had spent a period of time in Paris
working and ostensibly studying as a youth. He recalled his encounters with Togliatti,
Longo and with Berlinguer in 1980 and summed up relations briefly and somewhat
dryly: 
Over the years we have made mistakes but even you in certain circumstances have
not  done everything right.  But  for  five  years  now we have had a  very  positive
relationship and that is what counts.65
38 Both parties had now taken the measure of each other and had obviously developed a
respectful working relationship. Beijing hoped to see the PCI move further outside the
orbit of Moscow and the PCI hoped to see Beijing integrating itself more and more into
international institutions. Natta’s trip was however to be cut short due to the fall out of
the  Achille  Lauro incident 66 and  the  resulting  political  destabilization  in  Rome  and
ramifications of the standoff between Italian and US authorities. 
39 Further discussion had to wait until Hu Yaobang visited Rome in June 1986. This was a
visit well thought out and Hu, assiduously paid his respects to all the key state office
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holders  from  Prime  Minister  Bettino  Craxi,  Foreign  Minister  Giulio  Andreotti  and
President Francesco Cossiga, through the speakers of both houses, Fanfani and Iotti to
the  graceful  acknowledgement  of  ex-President  Pertini.  This  did  not  go  amiss  in  a
country that so values recognition. Apart from the special request for a day apart to
deal with meetings with the PCI, Hu also paid a visit to Turin and the headquarters of
FIAT as the last stop on his trip.
40 Rubbi states: “We were proven right. Upon returning home Hu accelerated the drive
toward political reform and renewal.”67 The question remains in the context of these
reforms and also the position taken by Zhao Ziyang, how much of an influence did the
detailed dialogue between the PCI and the CPC have on the outlook and policy of these
two key figures in the Chinese administration. Their admiration for Berlinguer and his
ideas  was  clearly  apparent.  The  outpouring  of  grief  at  his  funeral  certainly  as
previously evidenced had a distinct effect on Zhao Ziyang. I believe that the interaction
between the two parties did influence these two individuals greatly in regard to their
reformist  stance.  However  it  is  nigh impossible  in  the  available  documents  to  find
traces of this. In the transcription of a meeting on Natta’s trip Hu did declare that:
“Social  democracy  must  be  fostered  and  promoted  through  the  development  of
democracy  within  the  Party.  A  Party  that  has  vitality  and  dynamism can  promote
democracy within our country.”68 This seems a clear echo of PCI thinking. Both Hu and
Zhao recognized the implications for the PRC of failure to reform, Deng himself made
that clear in declaring that his reforms were essential to maintaining the CPC at the
apex of power. Both Hu and Zhao had observed how in Italy a Communist party could
command widespread allegiance and respect in a pluralistic system. I believe it was the
popular response to the passing of Berlinguer that convinced them that radical reform
was the way forward in China. In this sense Zhao seems very much a character in the
Gorbachev mould. Deng was much more of a realist and had understood also how his
own reforms had followed a path that was not completely of his making but had not
gone beyond any threshold that  would seriously  threaten the power of  the CPC.  It
would only be a short  time before the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square would
command the headlines.
41 The  events  in  Tiananmen  Square  caused  a  rupture  in  relations  between  the  two
communist parties as in the wake of public opinion, the PCI broke off relations with the
CCP. They were never really reestablished as the fall of the Berlin wall soon brought
about the end of the PCI as it transformed in a new entity the Partito Democratico della
Sinistra.  A  minority  effused  to  accept  this  and  renamed  themselves  Rifondazione
Comunista. Thus by the time relations between Italy and China were again properly
constituted again in the early 1990s, the party of Togliatti, Berlinguer and Natta was no
more.
42 There is a clear sense that post Tangentopoli, Italy lost China, this is the gist and title of a
seminal article by Francesco Sisci in Limes in 2005. 69 We have seen how a half dozen
years of real commercial and diplomatic success had been achieved and now almost all
was lost in the explosion of Tangentopoli. It was not simply that Italy had lost its place
because of the stasis of those years of investigations, rather economic relations went
into a tail spin because the Italian State had never invested in coherently supporting
them and thus whenever the political and economic winds varied there was always the
risk that what had been established would wither away. The motor of development aid
was simply turned off. The dynamic SME’s would continue to maintain a high volumes
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of exports for a number of years, but without government support their decline was
inevitable, as the Craxi boom came to an end and the Italian economy entered a period
of stagnation from which it is yet to emerge. Furthermore in the new governments of
the  Italian  Second  Republic,  despite  the  fact  that  a  process  of  trasformismo had
effectively left the underlying elites still  in control,  most of the old guard that had
experience in China were toppled. From the Chinese side there was a sense that Italy
had let China down. From this point on the nature of trade was altered. China began to
export substantially and Italy suddenly found its textile sector in particular in trouble
as cheaper Chinese manufactures entered the market. The end of the Cold War and the
fall of the First Italian Republic marked the end of a time period covering just over four
decades where despite certain plateaus, relations between Italy and the PRC had tended
to follow an upward trend from both perspectives. Thereafter the relationship would
become  more  distant  and  Italy  would  rapidly  slip  down  the  pecking  order  of
commercial and strategic partners.
43 This should however not obscure the very real successes of the 1980s. It represented a
period when there were effective synergies between the two countries. It allowed Italy
on the  back  of  the  confidence  gained in  the  economic  realm to  play  a  meaningful
diplomatic  role.  In the long term however trade volumes were just  not  sustainable
without a consistent export policy underpinned by appropriate investment. 
APPENDIXES
Oriana Fallaci’s interview with Deng Xiaoping
The interview by Oriana Fallaci was an interesting episode in itself, echoing somewhat
Nixon’s interview with Frost. It is again another vignette illustrating a small facet of
relations between the two countries without the scenario of institutional restraint.
Ironically due to this Fallaci became one of the few Italians to actually discuss directly
high level strategic issues with Chinese leaders. In practice this was a subject largely
avoided by visiting Italian politicians. Deng Xiaoping, with a more precarious hold on
power, hoped that the interview might help shore this up on the international stage
rather than leave a record for posterity. The interview had significant international
impact and was another episode in the same vein as Chung Kuo Cina which both sheds
light from a more media based perspective on relations between Italy and China in a
global context. Fallaci was certainly an interesting choice. Mao had used Edgar Snow
for an interview to set out his ideas, to be broadcast to the world. His encounter with
Curzio Malaparte as already described was a much smaller scale effort and had only an
Italian audience in mind. This time Deng’s interview was to be published jointly in Italy
and the US. It was as Pini describes, a message designed to be broadcast ‘urbi et orbi’,70 a
message that was to clarify and stabilize the position of the new regime. One might
have expected Deng to have gone for an English speaking journalist to increase impact.
It seems that Fallaci’s reputation as not being a walk over and one that was sufficiently
international met Deng’s criteria. She had previously interviewed Nenni in April 1971 71
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and Kissinger in November 1972.72 In 1980 she had done an interview with Enrico
Berlinguer, not long after relations had been reestablished between the two communist
parties. Such diversely political interviewees would certainly have recommended her as
a suitable candidate, as well as the fact that they were certainly not banal. Indeed Deng
seemed to be so happy with the first encounter with Fallaci that he conceded a second
session. Deng also had one to one encounters with another lady of forceful character
Margaret Thatcher, which he also seemed to relish. Fallaci’s opening gambit was to
wish him a happy birthday which caught Deng off guard: 
Deng: My birthday?! It’s my birthday tomorrow?!
Fallaci: Yes, I read it in your biography 
Deng: Uhm! If you say so… I do not know when my birthday is and nevertheless if it
is my birthday it is not exactly something to be congratulated upon. It means I have
reached the age of seventy six. Seventy six is a decadent age to be.
Fallaci: My father is the same age Mr. Deng, and if I said to my father that he had
reached a decadent age he would give me a slap. 
Deng: Alright! You wouldn’t want to say something like that to your father, eh! 73
Thus the ice was broken and one can sense the tone of benign sparring immediately,
that ran through the whole encounter. Fallaci moved on immediately to more serious
matters and directly the crucial question:
Fallaci:  Mr. Deng, in an article published by the Western papers you wrote that
China  is  at  a  turning  point  comparable  to  a  second  revolution.  And  indeed,  a
traveler who arrives in Beijing today, in the late summer of 1980, experiences an
almost physical sensation of great change: no uniforms, no slogans, no enveloping
red. As for the portraits of Mao Tse-Tung, so far I’ve only seen three, including the
one above the entrance to the Forbidden City in the company of  the images of
Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin. I have chosen this particular detail to lead into my
first question: Will these rare portraits of Mao remain? 
Deng: They will definitely remain. They will remain forever, including the one in
Tiananmen Square. In the past there were too many portraits of Chairman Mao. In
the  end  this  reduced  them  to  the  level  of  banality  making  them  trivial,  even
disrespectful, and therefore we removed them, but… Look, Chairman Mao made 
mistakes,  yes.  But  he  was  also  one  of  the  principle  founders  of  the  Chinese
Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China. Even taking into account his
errors, his positive actions remain primary. This means that the contribution he
gave to the Chinese revolution will always sustain his memory. We will always think
of him as one of the founders of the party and the People’s Republic.74
Deng thus got his primary message delivered and more relaxed, was happy to range
over many issues and respond in his own way. As the interview drew to a close he
echoed the message in no uncertain terms:
Deng:  Thank you and please make it understood [to your audience] everything I
have said. Explain well that it is necessary to promote an objective evaluation of
Chairman Mao, to first consider his merits, then his mistakes. Explain well how we
will continue to follow the ‘Thought of Mao Tse-tung’, but that we also clearly point
out where he made mistakes. Above all explain well that some of those mistakes
were also our responsibility, including mine! 
Fallaci: I will indeed Mr. Deng, please allow me one last question: What evaluation
would you give himself? 
Deng: Hmm! Listen: I’ve made mistakes, yes, and sometimes even serious mistakes.
But I have never done anything with malicious or bad motives. I have always done
what I have done with good intentions. So there is nothing that I feel I have a guilty
conscience about. Hmm! Listen: I would say that I could give myself a score of fifty
percent. Yes, fifty percent is fine.75
Italian Relations with China 1978-1992: The Long Carnival Decade - Burgeoning...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 88 | 2014
16
Thus straightforward Chinese self-criticism met the Italian Catholic confessional, with
Deng throwing in his own redemption. He was able to get his message immediately
across that there was a change in regime which was stable and which would not
desecrate the memory of Mao in the way Khrushchev had demolished Stalin. Deng
reserved his only harsh words for Mao’s widow Jiang Qing, whom he described as
absolutely rotten, meriting one part good, to one thousand nine hundred and ninety
nine parts bad.76 Mao himself in contrast received the assessment of one third bad, two
thirds good, a position adopted form ally by the party in July 1981. As Pini notes that
was the quotient that Mao himself had applied to Deng in 1973.77 
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ABSTRACTS
This article identifies the high point of relations between Italy and the People’s Republic of China
and argues that it was the prerogatives of domestic politics and specifically the aftermath of the
imploding of the Italian political system in the wake of the “Clean hands” investigations initiated
by judges in Milan that was responsible for the subsequent major rupture. The analyze focuses on
the varying trajectories of both states, which produced the circumstances that permitted a very
significant growth in Italian exports to the PRC, to the extent that in Europe only West Germany
boasted  a  superior  performance.  Attitudes  within  the  Government  are  further  examined  to
account for the volatile nature of relations both in the economic and diplomatic spheres.
Les  relations  entre  l’Italie  et  la  République  Populaire  de  Chine  connaissent  une  phase
particulièrement intense dans les années 1980-1990. À partir de ce contexte, cet article propose
d’analyser comment une question interne, l’implosion du système politique italien à la suite des
enquêtes  judiciaires  de  mani  pulite,  engendre  une  rupture  majeure  dans  ces  relations.  Les
évolutions  des  trajectoires  de  ces  deux  États  permettent  notamment  le  développement  de
circonstances favorables aux échanges : les exportations italiennes en République Populaire de
Chine font un bond en avant, et l’Italie se classe alors au second rang des exportateurs européens
en Chine, derrière l’Allemagne. L’examen des différentes tendances qui se manifestent au sein du
gouvernement permet cependant  de souligner  une relative  instabilité  des  relations entre  les
sphères économiques et diplomatiques.
Italian Relations with China 1978-1992: The Long Carnival Decade - Burgeoning...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 88 | 2014
19
INDEX
Mots-clés: Italie, République Populaire de Chine, relations diplomatiques, commerce, relations
économiques, Tangentopoli




Seamus Taggart earned a B.A. (Hons.) in History from Trinity College, University of Dublin in
1991, an M.A. (1999) in International Relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University and a Ph.D. (2012) in International Studies
from the Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID), Geneva. He is
the joint author of Italy – Garibaldi’s Mistake? (Edizioni dell’Orso, 2012) and various chapters and
articles on Italian and Irish politics and the use of political language including: “The Discourse of
Irish Nationalism: The Metamorphosis or Emasculation of Irish Republicanism?”, in The Changing
Political Language of Northern Ireland, edited by Patrick McCarthy, Johns Hopkins University,
Occasional Paper, European Studies Seminar Series, 1999. He is currently Research Coordinator at
the International Balzan Foundation in Milan, Italy. seamus. taggart@graduateinstitute.ch
Italian Relations with China 1978-1992: The Long Carnival Decade - Burgeoning...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 88 | 2014
20
